The Dutch Tulip Mania

The Dutch Tulip Mania, occurring between 1634 and 1637, was the first significant investment bubble accurately measured. Over this time, the price of some tulip bulbs grew by 50 times, yet in less than one-year values dropped as much as 99.8%. To date that is the most extreme investment bubble in history (Dent Jr. 49). Numerous investment bubbles have followed in the four centuries since, yet the lessons of the first still apply.

A bubble is “any unsound undertaking accompanied by a high degree of speculation (Garber 7).” “Bubbles lie at the intersection between finance, economics, and psychology.” Of the three, psychology is considered to be the most influential (Garber xi). Multiple factors enabled the Tulip Mania, which took place in the Dutch Republic.

First, Europe was experiencing a period of new wealth which enabled a new found interest in science as well as developments in botany and printmaking. Gardens became popular among the elite and information was shared more efficiently, allowing widespread knowledge of news and late discoveries (Dash-LP 57). Newspapers and pamphlets were an integral part of the Tulip Mania (Schiller 85). The first regularly printed newspapers appeared in the early 1600’s and the first Dutch newspaper appeared in 1618 (Schiller 248). With a high literacy rate, newspaper and pamphlet information disseminate fast (Dash 181).

Second, around 1610 tulips became particularly popular in Paris. Considered more spectacular than the rose, women wore a tulip in their cleavage. It was a competition among the ladies of the French court to bear the most spectacular tulip. It was said that, in Paris, a beautiful tulip was as highly valued as diamonds (Dash-LP 101).

Third, the Dutch Tulip Mania happened during the height of the Eighty Years’ War between the Spanish and the Dutch (Garber 19) and coincided with an outbreak of the bubonic plague. Two issues stem from these occurrences. First, this caused a shortage of labor which resulted in a rise in the labor wage rate and a surplus of money for those able to work. Second, a mood of desperation and fatalism was created among the population, enabling them to abandon reason (Dash-LP 65).

Fourth, the Dutch Republic had highly developed financial markets and a vast population of sophisticated traders (Garber 20-23). The first futures markets formed in Amsterdam in the early 1600’s within the timber, hemp, and spices industry. This model inspired the tulip trade. Tulip bulbs, however, became the first commodity to have futures traded outside of the city of Amsterdam and the first commodity traded by people that were not high ranking merchants (Dash-LP 172).

Lastly, the greatest innovation that allowed the tulip trade to become a speculative bubble was the promissory note. It encouraged speculation by allowing the sale and resale of written promises instead of physical bulbs (Dash-LP 171).

The tulip trade was initially only for “broken” bulbs. Broken bulbs were diseased bulbs that resulted in beautiful patterns on the forthcoming tulip. Tulip bulb breaking was unpredictable and made investing in a particular bulb somewhat of a gamble. Before 1634, tulip trading had been limited to professional growers. Over time, as demand in France increased for the broken tulips, certain varieties began to rise in value (Garber 41-43).

As the demand for particular varieties grew from year to year, it became well known that money could be made from owning them. As word of the increasing profit in the tulip trade spread, a new buyer emerged called the “florist.” The florist was a buyer that was not interested in the details of raising or cultivating tulips. Their sole interest was purchasing the bulbs and then reselling them for a profit (Dash-LP 152). As even experienced growers had a hard time predicting which bulbs would produce a particular variety, novice florists were purely speculating on a particular bulb. As more novice florists entered the market, bulbs began to be valued not just for their variety, but on the size of the bulb. Since, naturally, bulbs grow, this added to the rapid price appreciation (Dash-LP 176-177). Additionally, the tulip trade was quite risky because, unlike other commodities, the trader was trading a living item. Its value depended on the bulb remaining healthy and producing offshoots (Dash-LP 175).

With increased trading, traders progressed from buying and selling tulip bulbs in their possession to trading tulip bulbs that were still in the ground. Instead of exchanging bulbs, many traders now only exchanged promissory notes for ownership of the bulbs. Before the use of promissory notes, the tulip trade only took place during the few months of the year when bulbs could be lifted from the ground. Now, it was normal for people to buy and sell promissory notes for tulips that they never intended to own. Additionally, a buyer could obtain a promissory note to purchase a bulb at a later date by only paying 10% of the purchase price up front. The "promise" was to pay the remaining balance at the time of lifting. By trading tulips that would not be available for months, the tulip trade evolved into a futures market (Dash-LP 171).

Promissory notes brought about another change, buyers no longer had the opportunity to inspect the bulbs they purchased. They could not even be sure that the bulbs belonged to the seller or existed at all. The volume of bulbs being traded increased while simultaneously diminishing in integrity (Dash-LP 170). The trading of commodities that were not in possession of either the buyer or seller had first begun in 1608 but was outlawed by the Dutch government in 1610. For this reason, much of the trade in tulips during the Tulip Mania was technically illegal (Dash-LP 175).

Trading on the Amsterdam stock exchange, named the Beurs, was strictly regulated and only allowed between noon and two o’clock. In the 1630’s, around 400 licensed traders traded approximately 360 commodities at the Beurs. Since the legality of the tulip trade was in question, it took place mostly at night in local pubs. In addition to ducking regulations, tulip traders were often drinking while trading (Dash 130-132).

As popular tulip varieties became too expensive, dealers began offering more common tulips to the florists. By the autumn of 1636, the tulip trade was so popular that literally anything that could be called a tulip was valued and traded. Rapid price appreciation resulted in the trade of tulip bulbs that would have previously been discarded. Two examples of the price appreciation are the “Gheele Croonem” and the “Switsers.” The variety called “Gheele Croonem” traded for 20 guilders [1] in October 1636 and 1200 guilders at the end of January 1637. The “Switsers” once traded for 60 guilders during autumn 1636.  Then, 120 guilders on January 15, 1637, 385 guilders on January 23, 1637, 1400 guilders on February 1, 1637. They peaked at 1500 guilders on February 3, 1637 (Dash 141).

Traders began bundling less expensive varieties into large quantities, resulting in the quality of any particular bulb being unknown. The majority of the tulip varieties traded in the pubs were known as “vodderij” which means “rags.” The vodderij were sold by the basket and weighed in half-pounds and pounds. A one pound basket may have contained 50 to 100 bulbs (Dash 140). With the trade of these lower priced and lower quality tulip bulbs, virtually all citizens in the Dutch Republic could now afford to take part in the Tulip Mania. The greatest number of new traders entered the market during the months of December 1636 and January 1637 (Dash-LP 182-190).

The peak of the Tulip Mania is considered February 5, 1637, in the North Holland town of Alkmaar. On this date, a large and widely publicized auction was held to sell bulbs from the estate of Wouter Winkel. Having passed away a few months earlier, he had been one of the largest bulb dealers and one of the wealthiest men in Holland (Dash 151). Ironically, the collapse of the Tulip Mania had already begun two nights earlier in the city of Haarlem.

The tulip market collapsed at the end of the first week of February in the city of Haarlem, about two hours from Amsterdam. On the first Tuesday of February, a group of traders gathered for a tulip auction in a pub. When the first sale of the night began, a pound of “Switsers” was offered, unsuccessfully, at 1250 guilders. As the price was lowered, and still no bids, traders not only became more fearful of bidding, but they began trying to sell bulbs they already owned. Within a week, panic to sell spread across much of the Dutch Republic. The market for tulips collapsed. Most of the vodderij became worthless as their market completely disappeared. A few mock auctions set up by dealers failed to reestablish confidence in the tulip bulb market. (Dash 161-163).

Historians believe that it is unlikely the market would have collapsed so quickly if there was not already concern among traders that the rapid appreciation was unsustainable. Evidence exists that as early as December 1636, traders were nervous that prices were peaking, as some buyers began asking sellers for guarantees of future value. The collapse of the tulip market was so complete that there is virtually no information regarding the prices of tulips during the spring of 1637 (Dash 163-165).

With an exception of the most treasured bulbs, the market completely disappeared. For the rarest bulbs, prices only fell around 16% in the first month. However, over the next thirty years they dropped to around 1% to 2% of their peak value (Garber 70-71). There are a few factors that lead to the market breakdown.

First, while tulip traders agreed on the most valuable or the “first tier” of tulip varieties, there was no consensus on which varieties made up a second tier. Sub-par varieties changed with public opinion and popularity, resulting in neither price stability nor market predictability (Dash 159-160).

Second, during the Tulip Mania the demand for tulips considerably outstripped supply. By February 1637, the supply of both money and bulbs was exhausted. The total collapse of the market for non-first tier bulbs happened when there were no bear traders willing to buy at lower prices. The result was that most tulip varieties became worthless (Dash 166).

After the tulip market had collapsed, many florists were still liable for future contracts they owned. Most would default (Dash 169). In many cases, the rights of ownership were unknown due to the long complex chain of buyers and sellers of promissory notes. If one florist failed to meet their obligation, the entire chain collapsed (Dash 172).

Blame became a major issue after the market collapsed. Most involved in the trade considered themselves victims and many thought the Tulip Mania had been a conspiracy created by the richest traders. To avoid overwhelming the court system, most cities in the Dutch Republic forbid their magistrates from hearing any cases related to the tulip trade. Growers and traders were forced to settle terms on their own (Dash 184-187).

Two years after the collapse, many disputes still existed. Representatives from many cities throughout the Dutch Republic met in the city of Haarlem to reach a compromise. The agreement reached stated that buyers could free themselves of obligations by paying 3.5% of the price owed. While considered unfair to the growers, it was better than nothing. In the end, the collapse of the tulip trade had little impact on the overall Dutch economy as most of the profits and losses had never left the paper on which they were recorded (Dash 193). Also, no significant agricultural resources had been devoted to the tulip trade as most bulbs were grown in previously existing gardens within the cities (Garber 76-77).

The Dutch Tulip Mania serves not only as a fascinating window into a brief period in history; it demonstrates that little has changed in the world of trading over 400 years. Everybody is happy to jump on the bandwagon when money is in sight, regardless of the risk at hand. Once, of course, the tide turns, the same losers that insisted on participating, cry victim and look for someone else to blame. Understanding markets requires not only a knowledge of fundamentals but an acceptance of the follies of its participants. The lesson is simple; fundamentals may nudge a market, but herd mentality drives it.

Works Cited

Dash, Mike. Tulipomania: The Story of the Worlds Most Coveted Flower & the Extraordinary Passions It Aroused. New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999.

—. Tulipomania: The Story of the Worlds Most Coveted Flower & the Extraordinary Passions It Aroused - Large Print. Waterville: Chivers Press, 1999.

Dent Jr., Harry S. The Next Great Bubble Boom. New York: Free Press, 2004.

Garber, Peter M. Famous First Bubbles. United States: MIT Press, 2000.

Schiller, Robert J. Irrational Exuberance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

[1]The guilder was the currency used in the Dutch Republic. At this time, a silver drinking cup cost 60 guilders. A thousand pounds of cheese would cost 120 guilders. Eight fat sheep cost 120 guilders. Eight fat pigs cost 240 guilders (Dash 159).